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1 Introduction
For households in developed countries the automobile is typically the second largest asset
purchased after a house and is the most commonly held non-nancial asset (Aizcorbe, Ken-
nickell, and Moore, 2003). In the US, one third of all cars sold is nanced via leasing (e.g.,
see Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002; Johnson and Waldman, 2003) while a comparable proportion
of sales involves cash transactions (Mannering, Winston, and Starkey, 2002; Dasgupta, Sid-
darth, and Silva-Risso, 2007). Despite its importance, the exact association between leasing
markets and cash markets (also known as selling markets) is not yet fully understood. Al-
though some theoretical models exist (see Bulow, 1982, 1986; Bucovetsky and Chilton, 1986;
Purohit and Staelin, 1994; Purohit, 1997; Desai and Purohit, 1998, 1999; Saggi and Vettas,
2000; Huang, Yang and Anderson, 2001), they are mostly static in nature and make the un-
realistic assumption of perfect substitutability. Moreover, no study examines the empirical
link between leasing and selling markets for automobiles. The objective of the present paper
is to shed further light on this relationship. At a theoretical level, we make more generic
assumptions which permit for dynamic interactions and imperfect substitutability. At an
empirical level, we use US monthly data to model for the rst time the dynamic relationship
between leasing and selling market price variations. Our results motivate us to develop a
new dynamic leasing asset pricing approach for automobiles whereby shocks in selling market
prices are allowed to have a dissipative eect on leasing market prices and residual values.
In the next section we review the relevant literature. Section 3 lays out our model for
describing the interaction between price variations for automobiles in leasing and selling mar-
kets. Section 4, estimates empirically the model using monthly US CPI data and discusses
the implications of the results for leasing valuation. The nal section concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review: The Relationship between Leas-
ing and Selling Markets
The earliest attempts in understanding the association between leasing and selling markets
originate in the investigation of decisions made by agents in the markets for durable goods
under the so-called durable goods monopoly problem (see Coase, 1972; Stokey, 1981; Bulow,
1982, 1986; Gul, Sonneschein, and Wilson, 1986; Bucovetsky and Chilton, 1986; Purohit and
Staelin, 1994; Purohit, 1997; Desai and Purohit, 1998, 1999; Saggi and Vettas, 2000). Most of
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these papers assume that leasing and selling are perfect substitutes with market participants
that are indierent between the two alternatives. Moreover, the focus of these studies is
to investigate the conditions under which leasing is the optimal strategy in the context of
dierent market structures. A related strand of literature examines the relationship between
the markets for new and used automobiles. From a static perspective, Bresnahan (1981),
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Goldberg (1995) and Petrin (2002) gauge the market
power of introducing new products in the automobile industry. However, as argued by
Blanchard and Melino (1986) it is important to employ a dynamic approach for at least
two reasons which are discussed below. First, dynamics may arise in durable goods models
of two interacting markets where used cars constitute stock variables which are imperfect
substitutes to new cars. For example, Berkovec (1985) uses the econometric estimates of a
short-run model to forecast sales and other automobile industry variables. Rust (1985, 1986)
concentrates on dynamic consumer demand in durable goods with new, used and scrappage
markets for automobiles. Transaction costs in a dynamic setting are considered by Konishi
and Sandfort (2002), Stolyarov (2002) and Schiraldi (2011). Esteban and Shum (2007)
model the production decision of a rm in a discrete dynamic oligopoly setting in which
automobile prices are endogenously determined. Adda and Cooper (2000a) build a dynamic
stochastic discrete choice model of car ownership at the individual level in order to study
the output and public nance eects of subsidies on automobile demand. Eberly (1994) and
Attanasio (2000) study (S, s) models of household automobile demand with transaction costs
and liquidity constraints. Second, forward-looking dynamics may arise also in the demand
side of the durable goods market on the basis of consumer expectations of future prices for
new cars. In this case consumers are not myopic towards the future since they consider
their expected utility while making their primary decisions on if and when to buy. Chen,
Esteban, and Shum (2008, 2010) construct a calibrated equilibrium time consistent dynamic
oligopoly model of a durable goods market, which incorporates both the sources of dynamics
mentioned previously. In particular, Chen, Esteban, and Shum (2008) ignore the dynamics
by evaluating the bias in estimating the structural parameters of a static model. Chen,
Esteban, and Shum (2010) incorporate transaction costs in the used market which makes
purchases important on the demand side.
A prominent issue in the durable goods markets is the possibility of oscillatory behavior.
Sobel (1991) and Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel, (1984) consider a new group of consumers,
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with a heterogeneity of tastes, which enters the market sequentially and leads the monop-
olist to uctuate the equilibrium price periodically (Sobel, 1984, studies the same problem
in an oligopoly setting). Board (2008) considers the pricing behavior of a durable goods
monopolist for a new good where agents can strategically time their purchases and where
the demand uctuates exogenously over time. Janssen and Karamychev (2002) allow for in-
formation asymmetry in a dynamic competitive model of identical generations entering the
market over time. Caplin and Leahy (2006) develop an (S, s) model of oscillations in demand
which reects uctuations in the number of consumers who purchase the durable goods as
well as of variations in the demand of a single consumer. They use this model to analyze
the equilibrium dynamics of prices, the number of purchases and the size of purchases of
the durable goods. Empirical evidence by Bils and Klenow (1998) conrms that durable
goods prices have a tendency to move procyclically relative to prices of nondurable goods.
Blanchard and Melino (1986) construct a competitive equilibrium model with representa-
tive consumers and rms. Their intention is to understand the common cyclical behavior of
prices and quantities in a certain market for automobiles. Finally, Adda and Cooper (2000b)
concentrate on the demand side and estimate a VAR(1) model of aggregate income, rela-
tive prices of cars and consumer preference shocks. They report that the impulse response
function exhibits dampened oscillations in response to an income shock. This is explained
on the basis of two reasons. First, due to non-convex adjustment costs with heterogeneous
consumers, the endogenous growth of the stock of cars can generate replacement cycles and
subsequent oscillations in sales. Second, the oscillations can arise from the serial correlation
in income and prices.
3 Model Formulation
In this section we build a framework for modeling in a dynamic manner the interaction
between leasing and selling market prices for automobiles. Such a dynamic setting has been
studied previously only at a theoretical level by Huang, Yang, and Anderson, (2001). They
construct a dynamic monopoly model of leasing, selling and used goods markets, respectively,
with nite duration under an innite time horizon and nontrivial transaction costs. Although
our approach does not consider transaction costs and used goods, we assume a more realistic
oligopoly setting. Our approach is closely related to that of Esteban and Shum (2007)
although they concentrate on modeling the interaction between new and used car markets.
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We also dier from Esteban and Shum (2007) in the focus of our models. Specically, they
assume a discrete time approach and analyze the stage in which rms determine the new
car designs. Our continuous time model deals with the stage in which producers set prices
conditional on product types. This distinction makes the model of Esteban and Shum (2007)
backward looking, since the production choices of the rm today depend on cars produced
in the past. In our setting, rms are forward looking since their price choices depend on the
future.
Another important characteristic of our approach is that unlike most of the previous lit-
erature it does not treat selling and leasing of automobiles as perfect substitutes. As pointed
out by Dasgupta, Siddarth, and Silva-Risso (2007), the assumption of substitutability is
unrealistic for at least three reasons. First, automobile leasing contracts dier signicantly
from selling contracts in that the former typically comprise of several terms and conditions,
such as the price, the interest rate, the installment and the maturity of the contract. Sec-
ond, dierences in the discount factor used by consumers can also lead to dierences in the
evaluation of leasing versus selling decisions. Third, in the case of leasing the decision also
involves non-nancial clauses related to, for example, operating and maintenance costs.
For simplicity, we assume a market with a xed number of n lessors and m sellers of
automobiles which oer dierentiated services in each market, respectively. Following Miller
and Upton (1976) and Agarwal et al., (2011), we further assume that the representative
rms have as control variables the rates and not the prices of their products, emphasizing
in this way the nancial aspect of the lease contracts. Finally, we also assume that leasing
services are dierentiated from selling services. So, the representative lessor (seller) in every
period competes with the other lessors (sellers)-within market competition, and at the same
time with the sellers (lessors) in the other market- between markets competition.
As argued by Dudine, Hendel, and Lizzeri, (2006), the dynamic demand is driven by
both the durability of the product and by the anticipation of consumers for the future prices.
However, in the present setting, as Chen, Esteban, and Shum (2008), we assume for simplicity
that the consumer decisions whether to buy an automobile depend on their expectations
about future market prices which create forward-looking dynamics in the demand function,
and, subsequently in the decisions of the rms. In this manner, the demand depends on the
current rate level as well as on its time derivative.
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As Goldberg (1995), we focus on the second stage of a two stage game. Specically, since
the market is an oligopoly with dierentiated products, the supply decisions and the market
equilibria involve two stages. First, a long-run stage, in which rms determine the product-
mix and the quality of their products, and, second, a short-run stage in which producers set
prices given their product types. Since automobiles are durable goods, the representative
lessor, faces the following intertemporal problem:
max
RLi (t)
Z 1
0
e t(RLi(t)  cLi)qLi(t)dt
s:t qLi(RLi(t); RL i(t); Rk(t);
_RLi(t);
_R Li(t); _Rk(t))
(1)
The representative seller faces the following problem:
max
Rkj (t)
Z 1
0
e t(Rkj(t)  ckj)qkj(t)dt
s:t qkj(Rkj(t); R kj(t)RL(t); _Rkj(t); _Rkj(t) _RL(t));
(2)
where Ri(t) is the rate of rm i at time t and the subscripts L and k denote leasing and selling,
respectively and RL i(t) and Rk j(t) are the vectors of lease and sell rates of lessor's i sellers
j, \within" rivals,and RL(t), Rk(t) are the vector of lease and sell rates, \between" rivals,
respectively, dot denotes the time-derivative of the variable and ci is the opportunity cost of
capital (WACC) of rm i. In order to maximize his prots the representative lessor chooses
the instantaneous lease rate RLi(t) =
dPLi
PLi
= Li(t)
PLi (t)
, or, in discrete time RLi(t) =
PLi
PLi;t 1
=
PLi;t PLi;t 1
PLi;t 1
. Li(t)is the default free lease payment paid at the beginning of the period;
PLi(t) and Pkj(t) represent the leased and the purchased asset prices set from i lessor and
j seller, respectively, at the beginning of the period. As with the lessor, the representative
seller chooses the instantaneous sell rate,Rkj(t) =
dPkj
Pkj
, or, Rkj(t) =
Pkj
Pkj;t 1
=
Pkj;t Pkj;t 1
Pkj;t 1
in
order to maximize his prots.1 In line with Goldberg (1995), rms are assumed to be free
1Since the seller has already chosen Pkj ;t 1 in the previous period, the assumption of choosing Rkj ;t is
equivalent to the assumption of choosing Pkj ;t.
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of quantity constraints while attempting to maximize the present value of prots between
consecutive market periods. They use the same discount factor e t 2 (0; 1), where  denotes
the common rate of discounting and corresponds to their Weighted Average Cost of Capital
(WACC), i.e.,  = cLi = ckj for all rms.Finally, the demand functions are linear and set
equal to:2
qLi(t) = 0 + LiRLi(t) + L iRL i(t) + kjRkj(t) + k jRk j(t)+
+  _Li
_RLi(t) +  _L i
_RL i(t) +  _kj
_Rkj(t) +  _k j
_Rk j(t)
qkj(t) = 0 + LiRLi(t) + L iRL i(t) + kjRkj(t) + k jRk j(t)+
+  _Li
_RLi(t) +  _L i
_RL i(t) +  _kj
_Rkj(t) +  _k j
_Rk j(t)
(3)
The parameters 0; 0 are always positive; Li and kj are always negative since the demand
for the specic good is downward sloping in its own rate. Moreover, L i and k j we expect
to be positive since the lease contracts are substitutes and the same holds for the selling
contracts. The demand structure at hand allows a range of dierent degrees of substitutabil-
ity between the goods. In general, we consider that selling and leasing are substitutes when
kj ; k j ; Li ; L i > 0, while they are complements when kj ; k j ; Li ; L i < 0. However,
as recently discussed by De Jaegher (2009) the above denitions refer specically to weak
symmetric gross substitutes and weak symmetric gross complements, respectively. The de-
nition in general of substitutability and complementarity requires that not only the signs but
also the absolute values of the coecients kj ; k j ; Li ; L i > 0 to be the same. De Jaegher
considers the case when kj ; k j ; Li ; L i > 0 have opposite signs in which two goods are
strong asymmetric substitutes. In our setting, selling would be a substitute for leasing and
leasing would be a complement to selling, or, vice versa. If, for example, kj ; k j > 0 and
Li ; L i > 0 then the demand for leasing is a decreasing function of the purchase rate so
leasing is a gross substitute of purchasing. At the same time, the demand for purchasing is
an increasing function of leasing rate so that purchasing is a gross complement of leasing.
In our model consumers form expectations in a perfect foresight manner according to
dRe
dt
= dR
dt
. This constitutes the deterministic equivalent of the rational expectation hypoth-
esis and allows us to avoid complications related to adverse selection (see Akerlof, 1970;
Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999). If consumers expect rates to continue rising, their desire to hold
2The linear demand structure arises from a quadratic and strictly concave utility function (see Dixit,
1979; Singh and Vives, 1984).
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money is reduced so  _Li ;  _L i , and  _kj ;  _k j will be positive. However, if they expect that
rates will continue falling then they restrain from buying and  _Li ;  _L i , and  _kj ;  _k j will
be negative. The interpretation of the signs for  _kj ;  _k j and  _Li ;  _L i will depend on the
substitutability of selling and leasing. For example, when they are substitutes, if consumers
expect that the sell rate will continue rising then they increase their demand now. Assuming
constant supply, this leads to a rise in sell rates which in turn increases the demand for
leasing services. In this case,  _kj ;  _k j are positive. Conversely, if consumers expect sell rates
to fall then  _kj ;  _k j will be negative. A similar line of arguments can be made in interpreting
the signs of  _Li ;  _L i .
The rst order conditions of the optimization problems underhand in matrix form, which
correspond to the best response functions, are the following:
264 1    a _k1m... . . . ...
b _Lm1    1
375
266666666664
_RL1(t)
...
_RLn(t)
...
_Rk1(t)
...
_Rkm(t)
377777777775
+
264 1    ak1m... . . . ...
bLm1    1
375
266666666664
RL1(t)
...
RLn(t)
...
Rk1(t)
...
Rkm(t)
377777777775
=
266666666664
aL1
...
aLn
...
bk1
...
bkm
377777777775
;
where:
a _Lij 
 _Lj
 _Li
; a _kij 
 _kj
 _Li
; aLii 
2Li +  _Li
 _Li
; aLij ;i 6=j 
Lj
 _Li
;
akij 
kj
 _Li
and aLi 
(Li +  _Li)  0
 _Li
b _kij 
 _kj
 _kj
; b _Lij 
 _Lj
 _kj
; b _kjj 
2kj +  _kj
 _kj
; bkij ;i6=j 
 _kj
 _kj
;
bLij 
Li
 _kj
and bkj 
(kj +  _kj)  0
 _kj
(4)
The rst order conditions are obtained by substituting the demand functions into the objec-
tive functions and then solving the maximization problems using the calculus of variations
technique. The obtained system of rst order dierential equations is not in normal form
and can be reduced to an equivalent rst order system in normal form as following:
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266666666664
_RL1(t)
...
_RLn(t)
...
_Rk1(t)
...
_Rkm(t)
377777777775
=  
264 1    a _k1m... . . . ...
b _Lm1    1
375
 1 264 1    ak1m... . . . ...
bLm1    1
375
266666666664
RL1(t)
...
RLn(t)
...
Rk1(t)
...
Rkm(t)
377777777775
+
264 1    a _k1m... . . . ...
b _Lm1    1
375
 1
266666666664
aL1
...
aLn
...
bk1
...
bkm
377777777775
The reduction requires that the matrix
264 1    a _k1m... . . . ...
b _Lm1    1
375 is not singular.Since, the above
problem is not easily tractable we focus our interest on the symmetric equilibrium i.e., that
all leasing rms charge the same rate and all the selling rms as well. In the symmetric
equilibrium we assume that there is no \within" market competition or in other words that
all the leasing rms follow the same price strategy and the same is true for the selling rms.
So, under the symmetric equilibrium we end up with the following system of dierential
equations in matrix form:

1 m
n
a _k
n
m
b _L 1
 
_RL(t)
_Rk(t)

+

aLL
m
n
akk
n
m
bLL bkk
 
RL(t)
Rk(t)

=

1
n
aL
1
m
bk

where:
aLL  (n+ 1)L +  _L
n _L
; akk  k
 _L
bLL  k
 _k
; bkk  (m+ 1)k +  _k
m _k
:
(5)
This can be reduced to an equivalent rst order system in normal form as following:

_RL(t)
_Rk(t)

=  

1 m
n
a _k
n
m
b _L 1
 1 
aLL
m
n
akk
n
m
bLL bkk
 
RL(t)
Rk(t)

+

1 m
n
a _k
n
m
b _L 1
 1  1
n
aL
1
m
bk

:
This assumes that the matrix

1 m
n
a _k
n
m
b _L 1

is not singular, i.e., that:1 a _kb _L = 1   _k _L
 _L
 _k
6= 0.
Finally, we obtain the following system of dierential equations in normal form:
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_RL(t) = K1 + '11RL(t) + '12Rk(t)
_Rk(t) = K2 + '21RL(t) + '22Rk(t)
(6)
where:
K1 
1
n
aL  nm2 b _Lbk
1 a _kb _L
, K2 
1
m
bk  mn2 a _kaL
1 a _kb _L
and
'11 
n2
m2
b _LbLL   aLL
1  a _kb _L
; '12 
n
m
b _Lbkk   mn akk
1  a _kb _L
'21 
m
n
a _kaLL   nmbLL
1  a _kb _L
; '22 
m2
n2
a _kakk   bkk
1  a _kb _L
(7)
In the above system the two rates of return interact with each other linearly since their rst
time derivatives are proportional to a linear combination of their levels. The values of the co-
ecients ij determine the contribution that the levels of the variables make to their growth.
Specically, 12 and 21 relate the growth of the return of one variable to the level of return
of the other variable. So, a negative value of 12 indicates the negative contribution of the
level of the sell rate to the growth of the leasing rate, in the sense that the presence of selling
reduces the growth of the lease rate. In other words, if consumers cannot buy the good then
the rate of growth for the return of leasing will be higher. In this way, a negative value of 12
reduces the power of the leasing rms in the market. Coecients 11 and 22 indicate the
eect of the level of return on its own rate of growth. The characteristic polynomial of the
system's matrix  

'11 '12
'21 '22

can be written as '2  ('11+'22)'+('11'22 '12'21) = 0.
The signs of the coecients 'ij allow us to classify the dynamics of the two interacting
markets in four interesting cases:
Case 1. Stable Node
Arises when  = tr()2   4 det() > 0 where tr() = 1 + 2 < 0 and det() = 12 > 0.
There are two ways in which the trace can be negative. First, '11; '22 are both negative.
This means that we have competition only internally within each of the two markets and
not between them. For instance, an increase in the lease rate RL(t) has an inverse impact on
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the growth of both RL(t) and Rk(t) since the derivatives _RL(t); _Rk(t) are negative.Second,
either one of '11; '22 is negative while the other is positive with the negative being higher in
absolute value. Although there is competition within only one market, the level of competi-
tion is high enough to compensate for any growth trend in the returns of the other market.
In other words, the competition is present only in one market but it is large enough to lead
both markets towards their steady-state rates of returns.As an example, suppose that there
is internal competition in the lease market, i.e., '11 < 0, while in the selling market returns
are increasing, i.e.,'22 > 0. For the determinant to be positive, the term  '12'21 must be
positive since '11'22 is negative. So, '12; '21 must have opposite signs. When real roots are
positive, '11'22 > 0, an unstable node arises. The returns in both markets arise indenitely
and system deviates from its steady state. So in order to exclude the possibility of a bubble
in the markets we require that the real roots are negative.
Case 2. Saddle Point
Arises only when  = tr()2   4 det() > 0 and det() = 12 < 0. This means that
the interaction eect '12'21 is positive and greater than the product '11'22 and can be
realized in two dierent ways. First, if there is a high level of co-operation between the two
markets, '12 > 0, '21 > 0, which dominates the system dynamics. In this manner, the
interaction eect overcomes the positive combined eect, '11'22. Second, if the combined
eect '11'22 is negative, i.e., there is internal competition within one market and growth in
the other making the interaction eect nonnegative.
Case 3. Focus
Arises when  = tr()2   4 det() = ('11   '22)2 + 4'12'21 < 0 and tr() = 1 + 2 6=
0.The negative discriminant means that ('11   '22)2does not exceed in absolute value
4'12'21.Consequently, '12; '21,must have opposite signs. Such a situation may arise if, for
example, the lease market benets from its interaction with the selling market, i.e.,'12 > 0
while the selling market is damaged by its interaction with the lease market, i.e., '21 < 0,
and in the lease market there is internal competition ('11 < 0) while the selling market
is growing ('22 > 0). If the discriminant is equal to zero the interpretation is similar but
11
the interaction of the markets follows a node rather than focus equilibrium. In order to
exclude the possibility of instability and bubbles we require that the real parts of the roots
are negative and the trace is negative in the case of the focus and node, respectively.
Case 4. Centre
Arises when  = tr()2   4 det() < 0 tr() = 1 + 2 = 0. The negative discrimi-
nant is explained as in the previous case and the trace condition can occur in two ways.
First, '11 = '22 = 0, i.e., the rates of returns in both markets are unchanged. Second,
'11 =  '22, i.e., the intensity of the internal competition in the one market is equal and
opposite to that of the growth in the other market.
4 Empirical Application
4.1 A model of Dynamic Interaction between Leasing and Selling
Markets
Our sample is drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) database and corresponds to
the US which is the largest automobile market internationally.The period covered is January
2002 to May 2011, a total of 113 monthly observations expressed in constant prices of De-
cember 2001.3 Two city-average Consumer Price Indices (CPI) are used which correspond to
seasonally adjusted price levels of New Cars and Trucks (NEW) and Leased Cars and Trucks
(LEAS). The later is a component of the new and used motor vehicles expenditure class,
which is part of the CPI's private transportation component in the transportation major
group and it covers leases on all classes of new consumer vehicles. The CPI data collector
describes each selected vehicle lease in detail including seven aspects of the lease contract:
the vehicle make, nameplate, model, engine, transmission, options and lease terms. The
lease terms include characteristics such as the number of months of the lease term, the down
payment, the residual value, the depreciation amount and the total rent charge. The sam-
ple is updated by one model year each September through November in order to maintain
the same age vehicles over time. If a production model is discontinued, it is replaced by a
comparable model. A complete resampling is scheduled every 5 years. Finance charges are
not included in the CPI as well as any incentives associated with low-interest nancing, are
3The discussion closely follows Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov
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excluded from the discount or rebate amount.4The value that the CPI uses in LEAS is an
estimated transaction price that reects the vehicle base price, destination charge, options,
dealer preparation charges, applicable taxes, depreciation, and lease rent charge (the nance
fee portion of a monthly lease payment, similar to interest on a loan). The estimated trans-
action price also includes the respondent's estimate for the price markup, dealer concession
or discount, and consumer rebate.
A casual inspection of the CPI levels suggests some kind of inverse co-evolution between
the two series under study along with a smooth variation which is consistent with nonsta-
tionarity. As shown in Table 1.1, panel stationarity tests of CPI levels assuming a common
or separate unit root processes conrm that both NEW and LEAS are integrated. Cointe-
gration analysis suggests that no long term equilibrium relationship exists between the levels
of the two CPI series (results are available upon request by the authors). So, CPI levels are
used to calculate monthly rates of returns for selling (RNEW) and leasing (RLEAS), re-
spectively, as simple percentage changes and these are then used in the subsequent analysis.
Stationarity tests show that RNEW and RLEAS are I(0) indicating that the original series
is I(1).
Descriptive statistics of the returns appear in Table 1.2. The results suggest that both
series are positively skewed and leptokurtic. The maximum positive (negative) change was
1.53% or 3.64 standard deviations (-1.15% or 2.74 s.d.) for RNEW and occurred during
the recent crisis period on October 2009 (March 2008). Similarly, for RLEAS the maximum
(minimum) was 3.67% or 4.5 s.d. (-2.32% or -2.86 s.d.) on February 2009 (June 2009). The
Pearson correlation coecient between the two return series is -10.84% which is statistically
insignicant at the 10% level and suggests no contemporaneous relationship. However, the
null hypothesis that DNEW does not Granger-cause DLEAS is rejected with a test F-statistic
4The formation of the Leased cars and trucks index is based on the calculation of total monthly lease
payment. The formula, which uses the U.S. Department of Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics,for the calcu-
lation of total monthly lease payment is the following:Total Monthly Lease Payment=(Base Price of Leased
Vehicle) + (Transportation to Dealer) + (Total Price of Packages & Options) + (Dealer Preparation and
Miscellaneous Charges) + (Additional Dealer Markup)- (Dealer Concession or Discount),which is equal with:
(Capitalized Cost) (similar to the purchase price of a vehicle) - (Down payment) - (Rebate) - (Other Cap-
italized Cost Reductions) + (Tax) + (Other Additions to Capitalized Cost), which in turn is equal with:
(Adjusted Capitalized Cost, amount used to calculate base monthly payment) - (Residual Value, value of the
vehicle at the end of the lease) and this is equal with: (Depreciation Amount, the total amount charged for
the decline in value) + (Total Lease Rent Charge, the nance fee, similar to interest), which nally equals
with: (Total of Base Monthly Payments/ Lease Term, the number of months in the lease), or (Base Monthly
Payment) + (Monthly Sales/Use Tax).
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Figure 1: Automobile selling prices (NEW ) and leasing prices (LEAS )
of 6.0358 for 1 lag which is signicant at the 1.56% level. The hypothesis in the opposite
direction cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signicance.
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Table 1: Stationarity analysis of automobile selling prices (NEW ) and leasing prices (LEAS )
Method Test p-value
H0: Common unit root process
Levin,Lin and Chu (2002) t* 0.4818 0.6850
H0: Individual unit root process
Im,Pesaran and Shin (2003) W-stat -0.0392 0.4844
Maddala and Wu (1999), ADF Fisher 3.0436 0.5506
Chi-square
Choi (2001) PP Fisher Chi-square 3.7628 0.4391
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution.
All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
The derived system of dierential equations (6) of our model can be written in discrete
time as follows:
RL;t+1 = K1 + 11RL;t + '12Rk;t + uL;t+1
Rk;t+1 = K2 + '21RL;t + 22Rk;t + uk;t+1
(8)
where 11  (1 + '11) and 22  (1 + '22).This is a VAR model, of lag order one as our
theory dictates, in reduced form. Estimation of this VAR model via OLS and subsequent
elimination of the insignicant coecients led to the following results (standard errors appear
in brackets below estimates):
RL;t+1 =
Rk;t+1 =
0:2643 RL;t  0:4408 Rk;t + uL;t+1;
(0:0901) (0:1790)
0:3978 Rk;t +uk;t+1; R
2
adj = 0:153
(0:0888)
R2adj = 0:124
The estimated coecients allow us to draw several interesting conclusions. It appears that
leasing market price changes are inversely related to prices changes in the selling market
from the previous month ('12 < 0).From a biological perspective, this is characterized as a
\predatory" relationship of selling market over the leasing market. In line with the Granger
causality results obtained previously, selling market price changes do not seem to depend on
past leasing market price changes ('21 = 0).Both leasing and selling market price changes
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of monthly changes in automobile selling prices (RNEW ) and
leasing prices (RLEAS )
RNEW RLEAS
Mean 0.0001 -0.0004
Median 0.0000 -0.0011
Maximum 0.0153 0.0367
Minimum -0.0115 -0.0232
Std.Dev. 0.0042 0.0081
Skewness 0.3726 1.1606
Kurtosis 4.5428 7.3385
Jarque-Bera 13.6990 112.9836
p-value 0.0011 0.0000
are moderately persistent with the autoregressive coecients being positive. The modulus
of both roots is less than unity so we have a stable equilibrium point (stable node; see Case
1 in Section 1.3). Since both roots are real and distinct, shocks will dissipate in a monotone
rather than uctuating manner.
4.2 Implications for Leasing Contract Valuation
The standard framework of lease valuation (Myers, Dill and Bautista, 1976) adopts dis-
counted cash ow analysis to derive the equilibrium rental rate:5
PL;t = PL;0  
nX
t=1
Lt
(1 + )n
  RVn
(1 + )n
(9)
where RVn is the expected residual value of the asset in period n. By employing a uniform
lease payment we obtain the Myers, Dill and Bautista (MDB) formula:
L(t) =

1  (1 + )n

PL;0   PL;t   RVn
(1 + )n

or,equivalently, the lease rate:
5An alternative is the user cost theory approach of Miller and Upton (1976). A number of other valuation
models have been proposed in order to account for credit risk in lease contracts (see, for example, Grenadier,
1996; Ambrose and Yildirim 2008; Agarwal et al., 2011) or for various optionalities in leasing contracts (see,
for example, McConnell and Schallheim, 1983; Schallheim and McConnell, 1985; Grenadier, 1995;Trigeorgis,
1996). For empirical applications see Schallheim et al. (1987) and Giaccotto, Goldberg, and Hegde, (2007).
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L(t)
PL(t)
=

(1 + )n   1

1  PL;0
PL;t
+
RVn
PL;t(1 + )n

(10)
Given our model and empirical results, an obvious shortcoming of this valuation approach
is that it treats the leasing market autonomously and ignores any interactions with the selling
market. The remainder of this section will incorporate our ndings concerning the interaction
between the leasing and selling markets in the MBD valuation approach.
From (8) we can derive the motion for the system of lease and sell rates from the following
complementary function:
RL;t = A1
t
1 + A2
t
2
Rk;t = B1
t
1 +B2
t
2
(11)
where:
B1  A11   11
'12
;
B2  A22   11
'12
:
(12)
Moreover, since 1   11 = 0, we obtain:
RL;t = A1
t
1 + A2
t
2
Rk;t = B2
t
2
The arbitrary constants Ai are determined by the initial conditions of the system as
follows:
A2 =
Rk;0'12
2   11
RL;0 = A1 + A2
(13)
where RL;0 and Rk;0 have already been dened as RL;0 =
PL
PL; 1
=
PL;0 PL; 1
PL; 1
and Rk;0 =
Pk
Pk; 1
=
Pk;0 Pk; 1
Pk; 1
. So,having estimated RL;t and Rk;t, we can obtain PL;t and Pk;t as:
P^L;t = PL;t 1(1 + R^L;t) = PL;t 1(1 + A1t1 + A2
t
2)
P^k;t = Pk;t 1(1 + R^k;t) = Pk;t 1(1 +B2t2)
(14)
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Now, the following quantity:
Gt = PL;t   P^L;t = PL;t   PL;t 1(1 + R^L;t) = PL;t   PL;t 1(1 + A1t1 + A2t2) (15)
represents a capital gain or loss which results from the interaction between the leasing and
selling markets and could be used to augment the MBD leasing valuation formula. In other
words, this term reects an opportunity cost in the sense that the price of the leased asset
changes and this is something that should be accounted for. Another reasonable adjust-
ment that should be made concerns the residual value since this is an expectation of the
stochastic value which the asset will have in the termination of the contract (e.g., Trigeorgis,
1996, assumes that the residual value follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process). The residual
value is corrected here on the basis of the interaction with the selling market by using the
cumulative changes in the leasing market prices
Qn
t=1(1 + R^L;t). Finally, the overall eect
of the interaction with the selling market can be captured by the following augmented lease
valuation formula:
PL;t = PL;0  
nX
t=1
L
0
t
(1 + )n
  RVn
Qn
t=1(1 + R^L;t)
(1 + )n
 
nX
t=1
Gt
(1 + )n
(16)
We shall use a hypothetical example in order to illustrate the application and practical
importance for valuation of the interaction between leasing and selling markets. Assume
that we are considering the valuation of a contract for a car with a base price PL; 0 =
e30,000 which will be leased over a 6 month period with a terminal residual value RVn equal
to e25,000 (83.3% of the base price). Lease payments are due at the end of each month and
the lease is nanced at a monthly rate of 1%. Without taking into account the interaction
between the two markets, the traditional MDB formula gives a monthly lease payment equal
to e1112.74. Assume now that we are at October 2009 when the selling market price level
increased by 1.535% compared to the previous month (or 20.06% in annual terms). We
can use this information to recursively predict lease rates over the next 6 months on the
basis of the estimated model from the previous subsection. The predicted lease rates are
-0.86971%, -0.49903%,-0.23897%, -0.10575%, -0.04489% and -0.01861%, respectively, or a
total compound (average) expected drop of 1.77% (0.3%).These predictions are close to the
actual rates of -0.27942%,- 1.12581%,-0.19465%,1.10043%,-0.28486% and -1.84133% which
correspond to a total compound (average) change of -2.61% (-0.44%).If we use these values
in the augmented MDB formula we obtain a monthly lease payment of e1505.64 which is
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higher by e392.9 (or 35.1%) than the previous one. If the standard MDB formula is used
and the predictions of lease rates from our estimated model are realized then the lessor will
underprice the lease payment. This translates into a negative monthly internal rate of return
of -1.21% (instead of a positive 1%) which corresponds to an annual loss of -13.61% (instead
of a 12.68% prot). Using the actual rather than predicted lease rates gives an ex post
fair monthly payment of e1578.70 which is close to the estimate from the augmented MDB
model. These calculations suggest that our results have signicant practical implication for
pricing leasing contracts.
5 Conclusions
This paper describes a novel theoretical framework which leads to an interactive relation-
ship between leasing and selling markets for automobiles. This framework extends previous
approaches by allowing forward-looking rms which are set in an oligopoly while leasing and
selling are not assumed to be perfect substitutes. The simplest specication justied is a
VAR (1) model of lease and sell rates, which is estimated using monthly US data. Results
conrm a one-way interacting relationship whereby sell rates Granger-cause lease rates. We
show how this interaction can be incorporated within standard lease pricing formulas. A
numerical example demonstrates that our ndings have non-trivial practical implications for
lease pricing.
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